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serves  as the holding  company  for all state-owned  reduces  risk. They  calculate  the tradeoffs  between  return
petroleum  operations.  and risk from hedging  and find that for a risk-minimizing
Movements  in oil prices  are of major concern  to the  short hedger,  a 1-percent  reduction  in risk  would cost a
government,  and forecasts  of oil prices are built into the  reduction  in return of 0.65 percent.
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The oil sector is a critical sector of the Ecuadorian economy contributing about 17 % to the
country's  GDP.  Ecuador  began exporting  crude oil in  1972 and over the last two and a half
decades the oil sector has emerged  as the country's  most important sector.  The oil sector is
controlled by the government through the public sector enterprise,  PETROECUADOR,  which
serves as the holding company for all state-owned petroleum operations. Movements in oil prices
are of major concern to the government and forecasts of oil prices are built into the government
budget.  The  performance  of  the  oil  sector  critiically affects  Ecuador's  macroeconomic
performance and shocks to this sector has economy wide repercussions.
The volatility of the world oil market since the OPEC oil price shocks of the 1970's has
resulted  in  oil  export  dependent  countries  like  Ecuador  facing  a  considerable  degree  of
macroeconomic risk. Between 1973-81 when Ecuador first emerged as an oil exporter, real GDP
grew  at an  annual  average  rate  of  6.1 %.  During  much of  the  1980's,  oil  prices  declined
substantially. Over the 1985-86 period, Ecuador lost U$900 million equivalent to about 8 % of
GDP. Declining oil revenues resulted in large public sector deficits and a worsening balance of
payments situation. The effect of the oil price decline was that between  1981-91, GDP growth
averaged about 2.1%,  less than half the growth rate before the oil boom'.  Ecuador's dependence
on oil is such that even minor oil price declines have had a substantial cumulative adverse impact
on Ecuador's  macroeconomic performance.
Developing  countries  like Ecuador have sought to  achieve export revenue  stabilization
through International Commodity Agreements with importing nations. These agreements have
1  The source of these figures are Ecuador: Policy Options for
the Rest  of  the  1990's, Report  No.11161-EC,  Country Operations
Dept. IV, World Bank.however  not been successful.  Other methods  such  as stabilization  funds, contingent  financing  and
export diversification  have also not been successful  in stabilizing  export revenues.
An alternative approach to  stabilizing export revenues is  to  use  market-based risk
management  tools such as futures hedging. Though futures hedging cannot insulate exporters
from a long term secular decline  in commodity  prices, they are effective  in managing  short term
price risk. Using futures markets for hedging is a notion that is just now beginning to gain
acceptability  among developing countries. The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX)
estimates  that developing  countries  are increasingly  holding  a higher percentage  of the total open
interest in crude oil futures. Since the Gulf war countries like Mexico, Brazil and Chile are
regular users of the oil derivatives markets (see Claessens  and Varangis (1995)).
The objective of this paper is to assess  the risk management  prospects for hedging
Ecuadorian oil. We develop a portfolio model of hedging and use it to evaluate the costs and
beneiits of different hedging strategies. Our paper shows that there are effective risk reducing
strategies available to  Ecuadorian policy makers that would have reduced the variance of
Ecuadorian  oil revenues  over time. While these strategies  may necessitate  foregoing  unexpected
gains, they would have prevented unanticipated  short term losses. We provide estimates  of the
costs and benefits of different hedging strategies  that may aid in policy formulation.
2H. PRICE VOLATILITY, STATIONARITY,  AN1D  BASIS  RISK
The bulk of international  trade in crude oil involves  light to medium crude (API gravity
of 300 to 40°). Ecuadorian oil (Oriente) is classified as light crude. Ecuador's  monthly oil export
prices over the Jan.88-Dec.96 period is shown in Figure 1. The average monthly export price
(per barrel) for Ecuadorian  crude over this period was $15.92 with a standard  deviation  of $3.45
and an associated  coefficient  of variation of 21.67%. This is a high degree of volatility.
Before turning to the issue of hedging effectiveness,  the time series properties of export
(spot) prices and futures prices need to be investigated. The spot and futures prices of most
commodities  are generated  by stochastic  processes  that are nonstationary  (i.e. these prices are
random  walks). The practical implication  of nonstationarity  is that past prices cannot  be used in
predicting future prices. Moreover, transitory and permanent shocks cannot be distinguished
from one another. From an econometric  viewpoint,  nonstationarity  is  problematic  since estimated
parameters  are unstable and a regression  on nonstationary  variables  leads to spurious  results (see
Granger and  Newbold (1974)). Thus, a  nonstationary series must be  transformed into a
stationary series before any inferences  can be drawn from it. The simple logic for requiring
stationarity  is that models  inferred  from stationary  series  are also stationary  or stable. In general,
a nonstationary  series can be transformed into a stationary series by differencing. Table la
reports the results of a  Dickey-Fuller (D-F) test for nonstationarity  on the levels and first
differences  of both spot and futures prices. The D--F  test results confirm that both spot and
futures prices are nonstationary  in levels but stationary in first differences. Thus, regressions
must be constructed  in terms of the stationary, first differenced  variables.
3FIGURE  1
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Tests of Stationarity (Jan. 1988-Dec.  1996)
Variable  Dickey-Fuller  D-F  (statistic)  Augmented  D -F
(1) Spot Price  (Levels)  -2.69  -2.08  (6 lags)
(2) Futures  Price  (Levels)  -2.32  -1.97  (6 lags)
(3) Spot Price  (Differences)  -6.57**  -5.06**(6  lags)
(4) Futures  Price (Differences)  -6.51**  .-5.25**(6  lags)
Note:  The  critical  value  of the  D-F  statistic  for 100  observations  is -3.45.  **  indicates  significance  at the
95%  level.
Table lb
Test of Basis Risk  (Jan. 1988-Dec. 1996)
Regression  a  I  f  I  R2 I  D-W
ASt = a + flFt  -.02  .96**)  .81  2.37
(-.28)  (21.41) 
Notes:
1.  ASt=  St - St-,,  AFt=Ft  - Ft-I
2. D-W: Durbin-Watson Statistic
3. **  indicates significance  at the 95% level.  T-statistics are in parentheses.
4. The stationarity test involves the following regression:
AXt = a  + flXt-I  +  :P  ?i  AXt-i  + et
i=0
If Si = 0, Vi  this is referred to as the Dickey Fuller (D-F) test.  If S 5i X 0, Vi  this is
called the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test.  The optimal lag length, p, is chosen
using Akaike's Iformation  Criterion (AIC); p is the value that minimize's AIC.
If  8 is significant,  the null hypothesis of nonstationarity is rejected.  A significant D-F test
statistic thus rejects the null, implying stationarity. Note that the spot and futures prices in
levels are non-stationary but the spot and futures prices in first differences are stationary.
5The world's largest oil futures market is the NYMEX 2. The NYMEX  crude oil futures
contract which was introduced in March 1983 is based on pipeline delivery of 1000 barrels of
West  Texas Intermediate  (WTI)  crude in Cushing,  Oklahoma.  The quality  of Ecuadorian  Oriente
is similar but not identical  to WTI crude. If the quality  of the spot (cash) commodity  is identical
to the quality of the commodity specified  in the futures contract, the usual recommendation  is
to hedge all of the spot commodity  since the spot and futures price in this case tend to be highly
correlated. This type of hedge is called a "naive" hedge. But since Ecuadorian Oriente differs
from WTI crude, the effectiveness  of "cross-hedging"  Ecuadorian  crude using the WTI futures
contract needs to be determined.
Since Ecuadorian  crude differs from the WTI crude specified  in the futures contract  there
will be some divergence  between the time series behavior of Ecuadorian  spot prices and WTI
futures prices. This divergence is called "basis" risk. In general, the greater the correlation
between  spot and futures prices, the more effective  the hedge. Since R-square  (R 2) is essentially
a measure of correlation, hedging effectiveness  is measured by R 2, and basis risk by  1-R 2.
Table lb  reports the results of a regression of spot price changes on (nearby) futures price
changes. The R 2 of .81 and basis risk of .19 indicates  that Ecuadorian  crude can be hedged  using
the WTI futures contract. 3
2  Other  exchanges  that  trade  crude  oil  and  petroleum  futures
are the IPE  (International Petroleum Exchange), SIMEX  (Singapore
International Monetary Exchange) and ROEFEX  (Rotterdam Exchange).
Liquidity  is  however  highest  in  the  NYMEX.  Besides  liquidity
considerations,  Latin  American  countries  prefer  hedging  on  the
NYMEX because of time zone and trading hour considerations.
3  Note  that  the  regression  is  constructed  in  terms  of
stationary  or  differenced  variables.  Hedging  effectiveness  is
sometimes  measured as the  R2 of a regression of price levels. This
would be incorrect in our case given that we have determined spot
6Ell. RISK AVERSION  AND RETURN-RISK  TRADE-OFFS
To illustrate  the benefits of hedging, a simple  framework  is presented  here depicting  the
hedging decision as a portfolio selection problem in  which the hedger selects the optimal
proportions of  unhedged (spot) and  hedged (futures) output 4. The portfolio can then be
represented  as:
ERp =  Q.  E(St+l - St) +  Qh E(Ft+l - F) .................  (1)
where:
ERp =  Expected  return on the hedged portfolio
Q=  Unhedged  (spot) output or output available  for export
E(S,+, - S)  =  Expected  change in the Ecuadorian  export price from time t to t+ 1
Hedged output
E(Ft+  I-  Ft) =  Expected change in the futures price from time t to t+ 1
At time period t, St and Ft are known but S,+, and F,+, are unknown; St+, and F,+, are thus
random  variables.'
and  futures  price  levels  to  be  nonstationary.
4  The model here is similar to that  in  Satyanarayan,  Thigpen
and Varangis  (1993).
'We  have not incorporated costs into the model.  These costs
include  brokerage fees and the opportunity cost of  holding a  margin
account - i.e., the difference between the interest bearing notes
of the margin account and investing somewhere else. However, these
costs are considered very small.
7The issue to be determined  is if the country is better off not hedging  as compared  to some
hedging.  Here we will consider  only the use of a "short-hedge"  to insure against  price declines.
(A short hedge is one in which the hedger sells futures contracts). In a short hedge, a long
position in the spot market (Q >  0) is offset by a short position in the futures market (Q  <
0). Let h = (Q / Q,). If the value of Q, is set equal to 1, h can be interpreted  as the hedge ratio
- the percentage of the spot or cash position that is hedged in the futures market. Thus for a
short hedger,
ERp  =  E(St+, - St) - h E(F,+ 1 - F) ...................  (2)
If the portfolio is completely  hedged, that is, each unit in the spot market is hedged with a unit
of futures, then h =  1 ( i.e. naive hedge). If h = 0, then there is no hedging  and the expected
return on the portfolio is simply equal to the return on the spot market.
The Variance (Varp)  or risk of the portfolio is given by:
Varp =  Var(S)  +  h 2 Var(F) - 2 h cov(S,F) ................  (3)
where:
Var(S), Var(F) = variance of spot and futures price changes
cov(S,F) = covariance  between spot and futures price changes
8The expected utility (EU) function of the Ecuadorian  hedger is a function of the expected
return (ERp)  and variance of the portfolio (Varp).  Thus,
EU  =  E(Rp)  -X Varp  ..................  (4)
where X  is a risk aversion  parameter. Higher (lower) values of A imply higher (lower) levels  of
risk aversion. The model above is a mean-variance  model (see Markowitz  (1959))  and implicitly
assumes  that the hedger  has a quadratic  utility function or that returns are normally  distributed. 6
The optimization  problem is to select the hedge ratio which will maximize  EU. Thus,
8EU/8h =  - E(F,+1-Ft) - 2Xh Var(F)  +  2X cov(S,F)  =  0
Solving  for the optimal (utility-maximizing)  hedge ratio, h**,  from the above gives:
hi+ =  [cov(S,F) / Var(F)] +  [(Ft-E(Ft+ 1)) / 2X Var(F)  . (5)
Let h* =  [cov(S,F) / Var(F)]. The above may then be rewritten as:
h**  =  h*  +  ( [Ft-E(Ft+,)]  / [2X  Var(F)] ).  (6)
6  Quadratic  utility  functions  raise  several  theoretical
problems  (see  Arrow,  1971) but work by Levy and Markowitz  (1979)
and Kroll, Levy, and Markowitz  (1984)  suggest that the assumption
of quadratic utility is a reasonable empirical approximation.
9With infinite  risk aversion X-1o and the second term disappears.  Therefore,  for a risk minimizer
the first term in the equation above, h*, is the only relevant one. The variable h* is called the
hedging  component and is equivalent to the risk-minimizing  hedge ratio. Note that h* is the
slope  coefficient  of an OLS regression  of spot  pice  changes  (dependent  variable)  on  futures  price
changes (independent  variable). With infinite  risk aversion, the optimal or utility maximizing
hedge ratio is the same as the risk minimizing  hedge ratio (i.e. h**  = h*).
The second term in (6) is called the speculative  component  and implies  that the greater the
level of risk aversion, the smaller the speculative  component. The speculative  component is
however  positively  related  to the "bias"  (Ft-E[Ft+ 1]) between  the current and the expected  futures
price. The speculative  component  essentially  captures the effect of short hedging on expccted
returns. 7 If the expected futures price is less than the current futures price, the hedger  benefits
from selling ahead more of his output.
Table 2  reports ex-ante (before the resolution of uncertainty) and ex-post (after the
resolution  of uncertainty)  risk minimizing  hedge ratios and contrasts the performance  of four
portfolios - unhedged, naive, ex-ante hedged and ex-post hedged for the years 1991-96.  We
assume that hedges are placed at the beginning of each year by buying the one year crude oil
futures contract  on the NYMEX  and continued  until December, a month before the contract
7Equation  6 also  implies  that  if the  current  futures  price  is
an unbiased  estimate  of  the  expected  futures price  (i.e. Ft =
E[F,+ 11), the speculative component in h**  disappears and h**  =  h*.
Thus in  an unbiased futures  market, the risk-minimizing hedge ratio
is equal  to  the optimal  hedge  ratio.  Also,  with  infinite  risk
aversion the optimal hedge ratio is independent of this bias. See
McKinnon (1967) and Rolfo  (1980).
10TABLE 2
Performance of Hedged and Unhedged Portfolios (1991-1996)
Period  I  Portfolio  Hedge Ratio  Portfolio  Portfolio  Risk
Return  Variance  Reduction
. (US$/barrel)
1991 Hedge
Jan 88 - Dec 90  Unhedged  h =0  -.7758  4.10  -
Naive  h =1  -.5558  1.52  63%
Ex-Ante Hedged  h=  1.03  -.5492  1.48  64%
Jan 91 - Dec 91  Ex-Post Hedged  h= 1.64  -.4150  1.05  74%
1992 Hedge
Jan 89 - Dec 91  Unhedged  h=O  .1192  .7483  -
Naive  h=1  .1075  .1850  75%
Ex-Ante Hedged  h=1.05  .1069  .1701  77%
Jan 92 - Dec 92  Ex-Post Hedged  h=  1.62  .1003  .0888  88%
1993 Hedge
Jan 90 - Dec 92  Unhedged  h=0  -.4508  .7912  -
Naive  h=1  -.2300  .1938  76%
Ex-Ante Hedged  h=1.04  -.2212  .1820  77%
Jan 93 - Dec 93  Ex-Post Hedged  h=1.53  -.1130  .1123  86%
1994 Hedge
Jan 91 - Dec 93  Unhedged  h=0  .2783  .5504  -
Naive  h=1  .2275  .4143  25%
Ex-Ante Hedged  h=  1.05  .2250  .4166  24%
Jan 94 - Dec 94  Ex-Post  Hedged  h=.89  .2331  .4123  I  25%
1995 Hedge  |
Jan 92 - Dec 94  Unhedged  h=0  .0850  .5796  -
Naive  h=1  -.0742  .3392  41%
Ex-Ante Hedged  h=.88  -.0551  .3189  45%
Jan 95 - Dec 95  Ex-Post Hedged  h=.76  -.0360  .3120  46%
1996 Hedge
Jan 93 - Dec 95  Unhedged  h=0|  .4650  1.8134  -
Naive  h=1  -.0658  2.0624  -14%
|  Ex-Ante Hedged  h=.76  .0616  1.6748  8%
Jan 96 - Dec 96  Ex-Post  Hedged I h=.43  |  .2367  1.48  18%
11expires. 8 The ex-ante risk minimizing  hedge ratios in Table 2 are estimated  using information
available only up to  the period in  which the hedge was placed. Thus, the  1991 hedge is
estimated  using information  available only upto Dec. 19909.  The ex-post hedge on the other
hand is estimated  using the actual spot and futures prices that prevailed  over the hedge period.
The ex-post  portfolio is therefore  a benchmark  to compare  the performance  of the other hedges
since the ex-post hedge is based on complete  information  and thus yields the maximum  amount
of risk reduction.
The results in Table 2 show that in every one of the hedges the variance or risk of the
unhedged  position exceeded  the risk of the ex-ante hedged  position. The risk reduction  benefits
of the ex-ante hedges" 0 range from a reduction in risk of 77% for the 1992 and 1993 hedges
to  8% for the  1996 hedge. Thus, there are clearly substantial risk reduction benefits from
hedging Ecuadorian oil.  Notice also that the naive portfolio is less risky than the unhedged
portfolio  in all hedges except the 1996  hedge. For the 1996 hedge, a naive strategy would have
actually  resulted in increasing  rather than  decreasing  portfolio  variance. This simply  underscores
the fact that naive hedges are not appropriate  for hedging Ecuadorian  oil since the level of basis
8  There is no reason as to why the timing and duration of the
hedges cannot be different from that assumed in our paper. We chose
the one year contract over a shorter contract, in order to provide
simulation results over a longer period.
9  In estimating the ex-ante hedge ratios, we use information
up to three years prior to the  period in  which the hedge is  placed.
This is to ensure that only relatively recent information is used
in iconstructing  the ex-ante hedge ratios.
10The  percentage  reduction  in  risk  (1-  [Var(Hedged)/Var
(Unhedged)])  is identical to the coefficient of determination, R 2,
in a  regression  of  spot price  changes  (dependent variable)  on
futures  price changes (independent  variable)  . See Ederington (1979)
for a detailed derivation of this result.
12risk is high.
An aspect of hedging that does not receive much attention  is the fact that hedging  carries
an opportunity cost in terms of foregone returns. Whether the hedger considers these costs
reasonable or  not depends upon the hedger's degree of risk aversion. We turn  now to  a
discussion  of these costs and the effect of risk aversion on the hedging decision.
We estimated ex-post optimal hedge ratios at different levels of risk aversion using the
1994 futures contract as an example. Table 3 reports optimal  hedge ratios at different  levels of
risk aversion  and associated  return and risk levels. For values of X  between 100  and infinity,  the
optimal hedge ratio is essentially constant implying that for these values of risk aversion the
speculative  component  is insignificant" 1. Thus, it seems  that the optimal hedging strategy is not
significantly  different for reasonable levels of risk aversion. At values of X equal to or lesser
than .10, the results imply that Ecuador  should  buy rather than sell futures (i.e. negative  values
of h**  imply a long position in futures). This is not surprising  in view of the relation  that existed
between  Ft and E(F,+ 1) over the life of the 1994  contract. Over the hedge period, the mean  value
of (Ft+ 1-Ft) was equal to .0508 (U$/barrel). Given that the expected futures price, on average,
exceeds  the current futures  prices over the life of this contract, the recommendation  is to go net
long in futures at lower levels of risk aversion to profit from this price bias.
We calculated  portfolio returns and variances for hedge (h) ratios between 0 and 1.
These results are reported in Table 4 and graphed in Figure 2. Figure 2 is a mean-standard
deviation  portfolio  opportunity  frontier and depicts  the return and risk trade-offs  from hedging
11  This  result  is  similar  to  Rolfo's  (1980)  result  on  optimal
hedging for cocoa producing countries and Ouattara, Schroeder, and
Sorenson's  (1992)  work on coffee hedging for C6te d'Ivoire.
13Table 3
Optimal Hedge Ratios, Portfolio Return and Risk at Different Levels of Risk Aversion
Risk Aversion  Optimal Hedge  Portfolio  Portfolio
Parameter  Ratio  Return  Standard
A___________h**  (US$/barrel)  Deviation
oo  .89  .23  .64
10,000  .889  .23  .64
1,000  .889  .23  .64
100  .888  .23  .64
10  .875  .23  .64
1  .743  .24  .65
.10  -.574  .31  .89
.01  -13.75  .98  6.14
001  -145.54  7.68  61.01




Hedge  Risk  %  %
Ratio  Aversion  Porfolio  Portfolio  Reduction  Reduction
h**  Parameter  Return  Variance  in Return  in Risk  Cost
0  .1645  .2783  .5504  - -
.10  .1853  .2733  .5212  1.8  5.3  .34
.20  .2122  .2682  .4954  3.7  10.0  .37
.30  .2482  .2631  .4731  5.5  14.0  .39
.40  .2988  .2580  .4543  7.3  17.5  .42
.50  .3755  .2529  .4390  9.1  20.3  .45
.60  .5049  .2478  .4271  11.0  22.4  .49
.70  .7707  .2428  .4187  12.8  23.9  .53
.80  1.6270  .2377  .4138  14.6  24.8  .59
.89*  x*  .2331*  .4122*  16.3  25.1*  .65*
.90  -14.64  .2326  .4123  16.4  25.1  .66
1.00  -1.33  .2275  .4143  18.3  24.7  .74
Note: * indicates values associated with the minimum-variance  portfolio.
14FIGURE  2
RETURN-RISK  TRADE-OFFS  FROM  HEDGING
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Portfolio  Standard  Deviation
Note: The numbers  on the portfolio opportunity frontier refer to hedge ratios.
M stands for the minimum risk portfolioEcuadorian  oil. The highest return and the highest  risk (standard  deviation) are associated  with
the unhedged portfolio (h=O). The minimum risk portfolio corresponds  to Point M with an
associated  return of .2331 (U$/barrel) and a standard deviation  of .642 (variance  of .4122). In
between the hedge ratios of 0 and .89, lie successive  portfolios  corresponding  to lower risk but
also lower  return. Note that portfolios  on the negatively  sloped  portion  of the opportunity  set can
be eliminated. These portfolios are  inefficient  because for the same risk, portfolios on the
positively  sloped portion yield a higher return.
Figure 2 illustrates  the basic policy dilemma  faced by the hedger. The fundamental  issue
is if it is worth foregoing the unhedged rate of return and insuring against possible oil price
declines  by accepting  a lower rate of return..  The decision to hedge is influenced  by the level of
risk aversion. Other important considerations  in the hedging  decision  is the cost of the structural
adju.stments  (fiscal  and budgetary  adjustments)  often undertaken  in the face of unexpected  price
declines.
We also calculated  the explicit costs of hedging  Ecuadorian  oil. Hedging  is effective  if the
decrease  in risk is sufficient  to compensate  the hedger for the decrease in return. We compared
the return and variance of the unhedged and hedged positions to calculate a cost elasticity
measure  as follows:
Cost of Hedging = (Percentage  Reduction  in Return) / (Percentage  Reduction  in Variance);
where:
% Reduction in Return  =  1 - [(Return of Hedged) / (Return of Unhedged)]
% Reduction in Risk  =  1-  [Variance (Hedged) / Variance (Unhedged)]
16These cost elasticities  are shown in the last column oiF  Table 4 and range between .34 to .74,
with  larger values implying higher costs of  risk reduction. The cost associated with the
minimum-variance  portfolio is .65 which implies that a 1% reduction in risk will result in a
.65 % reduction in return" 2. Whether this is a reasonable  cost of risk reduction or not depends
upon the hedgers's degree of risk aversion.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper investigates  methods  to reduce  risk for Ecuadorian  oil exports through hedging
in futures markets. We find that hedging Ecuadorian  oil has significant  risk reduction  potential.
We simulated  ex-ante cross hedges  for 1991-96  and found that in each case, ex-ante  hedging  was
effective in reducing price risk. We calculated the return and risk trade-offs from hedging
Ecuadorian  oil and found that for a risk minimizing  short hedger, a 1  % reduction  in risk would
have cost a reduction in return of .65 %.
We conclude  that there are risk reduction  benefits from hedging Ecuadorian  oil. We have
provided some estimates of  the opportunity costs of hedging that may aid  in the hedging
decision.
12  The portfolio  opportunity  frontier  (and thus return-risk
trade-offs) will  change  depending on  the  levels, variances  and
covariances  of  spot  and  futures  price  changes  and  would  be
different in another period. The resuLts  here are indicative of the
nature of the trade-offs prevailing  in this market.
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